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Abstract
A great deal of attention has been paid to the performance of international joint ventures (IJVs) and trust has been recognised as a key
factor influencing it. This paper examines the emergence of trust as a process and develops a process model of trust building in IJVs, which is
used to analyse four case studies. The main conclusions are the following: Whereas competence-based trust starts from public information,
promissory-based trust and goodwill-based trust are individually orientated and mainly develop through direct personal interaction. Such
interaction may lead to bonds of friendship between delegates. Before these bonds evolve, trust is mainly based on the perceived self-interest
of the partner in the joint venture. When the bonds of friendship dominate, the main source of trust shifts towards emotional commitments.
Thus, in the early stages of an IJV, promissory-based trust predominates, and as the joint venture progresses, competence-based trust emerges.
Goodwill-based trust is important throughout the process. A commitment to cooperate emerges from initial self-interest. The model is capable
of further development and testing.
D 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
International joint ventures (IJVs) are frequently stated to
be increasingly popular but with significant managerial
dissatisfaction in their operations (Madhok, 1995a). There-
fore, a great deal of attention has been paid to the perform-
ance of IJVs (e.g., Contractor and Lorange, 1988; special
issue of JIBS no. 5, 1996; Hyder and Ghauri 2000).
Particular emphasis has been placed on the dynamic pro-
cesses within IJVs, including conflict resolution strategies
(Lin and Germain, 1997) and the development of trust
between the partners (Parkhe, 1993b; Madhok, 1995b;
Arin˜o and Torre, 1996).
This article examines the development of trust in IJVs
over time. Many scholars have recognised trust as a key
factor in improving the performance of IJVs (including
Gabarro, 1978; Granovetter, 1985; Parkhe, 1993a; Ganesan,
1994; Ring and van de Ven, 1994; Nooteboom, 1996; Uzzi,
1997). Our approach is to formulate propositions based on
transaction cost process analyses in which trust is seen as
both an input and an output in various stages of devel-
opment of the IJV. Trust reduces transaction costs because it
‘‘economises on the specification and monitoring of con-
tracts and material incentives for co-operation’’ (Noote-
boom, 1996, p. 989). Buckley and Casson (1988, p. 32)
argue that the firm essence of voluntary interfirm coopera-
tion lies in ‘‘coordination effected through mutual forbear-
ance, which in turn becomes possible where there is
reciprocal behaviour and mutual trust.’’ When trust is
present, managers will find ‘‘ways by which the two parties
can work out difficulties such as a power conflict, low
profitability and so forth’’ (Sullivan and Peterson, 1982 in
Dwyer et al., 1987, p. 23).
The emergence of trust is a process. Every process has
inputs and outputs. The process is likely to be recursive, not
linear. However, it is useful as a first approximation to build
a linear schema of the trust development process, and this
we do below in developing our research propositions.
The following section explains the notion of trust, its
dimensions and sources ending with a formal definition.
We then examine a transaction cost approach to trust, and
a process model is introduced. The four IJV cases are
then examined, and the model is applied to their devel-
opment. The conclusion presents refinements to the initial
model.
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2. Explaining trust
The first question is whether trust is simply a subset of
risk taking (Corazzini, 1977; Gill and Butler, 1996; Luh-
mann, 1988) or whether it has a more moral basis (Hosmer,
1995; Craswell, 1993). In this discussion, trust is exempli-
fied as an explanation of particular behaviour; for example,
‘‘X loaned some money to Y. What might explain X’s
behaviour?’’ (Craswell, 1993, p. 487). Deutsch (1962)
argues that trust arises only when the expected loss is
greater than the expected gain, otherwise ‘‘trust would be
a matter of simple economic rationality’’ (Hosmer, 1995, p.
381). This is in line with Williamson’s (1993) presumption
of opportunism and calculative behaviour. He believes that
actors who seemingly take a leap of faith are mostly
behaving in a self interested way. Williamson thus argues
that trust is not the right word to use in such cases. Craswell
(1993), however, also recognises instances in which indi-
viduals take leaps of faith because they trust others. He
thereby acknowledges that actors do not always act from
calculative motives (see also Rempel et al., 1985; Luhmann,
1988). Some definitions only emphasise (an absence of)
negative behaviour (e.g., Nooteboom, 1996), including
cheating, while others focus on more positive conduct, such
as doing more than is expected (e.g., Sako, 1992). Madhok’s
(1995b) explanation starts from a presumption of opportun-
ism, but then goes to observe (from four interviews) the
growth of trust, while Das and Teng (1998) suggest that
trust is strongly related with control.
2.1. Dimensions of trust
Authors have used different dimensions of trust and
distrust (see, e.g., Lewicki et al., 1998; Bigley and Pearce
1998), however, in order to define trust, we follow Sako
(1992) who makes clear distinctions between three different
dimensions of trust in interfirm relationships. The dimensions
she distinguishes are: contractual-based trust, competence-
based trust (Ganesan, 1994 combines both promissory-based
trust and competence-based trust into the label ‘credibility’)
and goodwill-based trust (other labels for this type of trust
are, amongst others, character-based trust (Gabarro, 1978),
behavioural trust (Nooteboom, 1996) and benevolence
(Ganesan, 1994).
Promissory-based trust arises from the explicit written or
oral agreements that partners make during the joint venture
relationship. When making such agreements, a party should
be relied upon to keep to that agreement. Our definition of
promissory-based trust follows: ‘‘an expectation that a party
can be relied upon to carry out a verbal or written promise.’’
The second form, competence-based trust, refers to ‘‘an
expectation that a party will perform its role competently’’
(Barber 1983, p. 15).
The third dimension, goodwill-based trust, is explained
by Sako (1992, p. 39) in the following way, ‘‘The key to
understanding goodwill-based trust is that there are no
explicit promises which are expected to be fulfilled, as in
the case of contractual-based trust, nor fixed professional
standards to be reached, as in the case of competence-based
trust.’’ This, then, is a less self-interested, nonegotistic form
of trust.
2.2. Sources of trust
Is it possible to use the term ‘trust’ when one person
believes that the other is acting in a trustworthy fashion for
other than moral reasons (Hosmer, 1995)? Cooperative
behaviour can occur even when the motives are material
advantage or fear of sanctions (Buckley and Casson, 1988).
So X believes Y will keep a promise because X thinks that Y
has a clear self-interest in being ‘trustworthy.’ Table 1
represents a schema examining the determinants of cooper-
ative behaviour that classifies its determinants into micro/
macro determinants and egotistic/nonegotistic motives (Wil-
liams, 1988). The range of motives underlying trust can range
from material advantage and fear of sanctions to an ethical
stance based on superordinate goals and personal emotions.
Our formal definition of trust thus is: ‘‘on expectation that
a party can be relied on to keep to agreements (promissory),
will perform its role competently (competence) and that the
party will behave honourably even where no exploit prom-
ises or performance guarantees have been made (goodwill).’’
This is a wider definition and, as we shall see, it may be
necessary to uplift the concept back into its component parts
in practical situations.
3. The role of trust in IJVs: a transaction cost approach
The distinctive characteristic of a joint venture, which is
shared ownership, is also its key problem (Killing, 1982;
Beamish and Banks, 1987; Hennart, 1988; Geringer and
Hebert, 1989). Shared control implies two or more com-
panies deciding the strategic direction and operational issues
of the joint subsidiary. Shared control brings with it
increased transaction costs.
Transaction costs have both ex ante and ex post ele-
ments. Ex ante transaction costs include drafting, negotiat-
ing and safeguarding an agreement. They can be quantified
by examining actual costs (mainly management time) of
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the agreement process and examining the insurance costs
of default. Ex post transaction costs are more complex.
They include: (1) the adaptation costs incurred when
transactions drift out of alignment with the terms of the
agreement, (2) the haggling costs incurred if bilateral
efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments, (3) the
set-up costs and running costs associated with the govern-
ance structures (either in the courts or outside them) to
which any disputes are referred and (4) the bonding costs
of effecting secure commitments. Ex post costs are not
easily quantifiable prior to the implementation of the
agreement because they include an element of uncertainty.
(How likely is it that the partner will default on the
agreement?) This implicit probability exists in the minds
of the executives entering the agreement. It is difficult for
the executives to articulate the complexity of these issues
and, hence, ‘‘The transaction costs that are really there, in
the sense that they determine the outcome are those
transaction costs that are perceived by the manager (or
managers) who make the decisions’’ (Buckley and Chap-
man, 1997, p. 139).
The role of trust can now be seen in clear focus. Trust is a
transaction-cost-reducing mechanism that lowers the sub-
jective risk of entering into an agreement. Both ex ante and
ex post elements are reduced by trust. Costs of negotiating
are reduced (perhaps legal trappings are replaced by ‘a
gentleman’s agreement’) and the subjective probability of
ex post transactions failure declines when the parties trust
one another.
Buckley and Casson (1988, p. 32) approach the issue of
trust by defining cooperation as ‘‘co-ordination effected
through mutual forbearance.’’ Forbearance is refraining
from cheating (avoiding opportunism in Williamson’s,
1975 term). Cheating may take a weak form—failing to
perform a beneficial act for the other party, or a strong
form—committing a damaging act. The incentives for
forbearance arise from the possibility of reciprocity, leading
to mutual forbearance. Parties that are observed to forbear
may gain a reputation for this behaviour, which makes them
potentially attractive partners for others. The parties to a
successful agreement may develop a commitment to mutual
forbearance, which cements the partnership, and, in this
way, mutual trust is created, which alters the preferences of
the parties towards a mutually cooperative mode. Thus,
short-term, self-interested behaviour becomes converted to
cooperative trusting behaviour, with beneficial transaction-
cost-reducing results. This analysis is suggestive of a
process method of analysing the key issue of developing
trust in intracompany relationships.
4. A process model of trust
The main problem is ‘how can trust be developed
between parties within IJV relationships?’ Here, the devel-
opment of trust is analysed within a process framework
(illustrated in Fig. 1), based on Ring and van de Ven (1994)
and Larson (1992). The framework provides the basic
concepts for our model, but it is further formalised into
discrete stages of development.
The process framework indicates that trust in IJVs will
develop through four different stages. The first stage is the
previous history. This is the stage before the parties meet
to negotiate the joint venture. During this stage, one party
may construct an initial mental image of the other party
with whom they will create the joint venture. The parties
come together in order to negotiate the joint venture
during the negotiation stage. ‘‘In the commitment stage,
the will of the parties meet, when they reach an agreement
on the obligations and rules for future action in the
relationship’’ (Ring and van de Ven, 1994, p. 98). ‘‘In
the execution phase, the commitments and rules of action
are carried into effect’’ (Ring and van de Ven, 1994, p.
98). Renegotiations may take place after each period of
execution during official board meetings. When one or
both parties cannot maintain the commitment, the IJV
Fig. 1. A process model of the development of trust in IJV relationships. Source: Based on Ring and van de Ven (1994) and Larson (1992).
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relationship will cease to exist. Having described these
stages and the dimensions of trust, the following two
subquestions arise.
 Do all three dimensions of trust develop in each stage or
do different dimensions of trust develop in different
stages?
 What are the sources of trust and do they change over
time?
These questions are relevant to purely national joint ven-
tures, as well as IJVs. However, there are purely inter-
national issues, which we highlight below.
The conceptual model that we derive for analysis is
presented in Fig. 2. It combines the concepts of Williams
(1988), Ring and van de Ven (1994), Larson (1992) and
Sako (1992). The model suggests a sequential process,
arbitrarily broken into stages with each stage having both
inputs and outputs. Based on the literature, reviewed earlier,
and our framework, we derive the following propositions:
Proposition 1: The development of trust can be examined
as a sequential process. These inputs build on the previous
stage and represent the generation of trust from interactions
in the earlier stage. The output of trust feeds into the next
stage of the process. Trust can either be generated de novo
or can result as part of the ongoing process. It should be
noted that at any stage mistrust (or distrust) can also be
generated as an input into the next stage.
Proposition 2: The development of trust as a sequential
process can be broken into stages where the output of a
preceding stage can be regarded as an input into the next.
The input of Stage 1 (Reputation) will be affected by the
output of past joint ventures, and firms will build their
reputation for successful joint venturing by generating trust
from previous IJVs, which can be observed directly by their
partners and indirectly by future, potential partners.
Proposition 3: The history of previous IJVs represents the
final stage (input) of the process of building trust.
Proposition 4: The negotiations stage has an input from
previous history of IJVs and generates on output ‘commit-
ment’ to the next stage of trust building.
Proposition 5: The commitment stage has an input from
negotiations and an output to the execution stage of the IJV.
Proposition 6: The execution stage has an input from the
commitment stage and (observed) output to the next
Fig. 2. A process model of the development of trust in IJVs.
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generation of IJVs (as the ‘previous history’ of the partners).
These propositions are shown diagrammatically in Fig. 2.
5. The four case studies
The case research method is appropriate to the study of
the development of trust over time (Yin, 1989; Stafford,
1995; Parkhe, 1993b). The aim of this research is to study
development over time, and so we wanted to examine
joint ventures that varied in the length of time they had
existed. Secondly, we were interested in international as
opposed to national joint ventures. Hence, the joint ven-
tures should at least have one foreign partner. However, in
order to constrain cultural differences between the cases,
and thus to reduce a major source of variation, we selected
joint ventures with foreign partners from countries with
similar cultures. All the partners are from EU member
countries. The cases that we selected are (1) ABG, (2)
Kemax, (3) LAP and (4) DSM-BASF. It was felt that
relative cultural closeness would allow us to focus on
issues of trust, which might be obscured if wide cultural
differences were encountered. The limitations of the use of
only four examples of IJVs needs to be borne in mind
throughout the paper. The cases are not chosen to be
representative of the population of IJVs, but as illustrative
material against which to demonstrate the testability of our
propositions.
(1) ABG is a joint venture between Gamma in Scandi-
navia and Alpha and Beta in The Netherlands. ABG was
established in 1976, is located in The Netherlands and
produces an intermediate chemical product. Alpha and Beta
each hold 30% of the joint venture’s equity, Gamma holds
40%. All the three parent companies are users of the output
of the joint venture ABG. Each parent achieves security of
supply, gains economies of scale in the production of the
intermediate by ABG and shares risks (Fig. 3). In addition,
the venture reduces competitive bidding between the parents
for the input and raises the possibility of collusion between
them. This is a classic case of an indivisibility in part of the
supply chain leading to an IJV solution.
(2) Kemax is a joint venture between Kemira, Sweden
and Akzo Nobel, The Netherlands. Kemax was established
in 1993, is located in The Netherlands and also produces a
chemical product. Kemira holds 51% of the joint venture’s
equity, Akzo Nobel owns the remaining 49%. The produc-
tion processes of the joint venture and Akzo Nobel are
connected to each other (see Fig. 4). Akzo Nobel produces
an intermediate product as a by-product of its main produc-
tion process. The joint venture Kemax distillates this by-
product from the main stream of waste and sells the product
via the marketing channels of Kemira. The advantage for
Fig. 3. The physical structure of the joint venture ABG.
Fig. 4. The physical structure of the joint venture Kemax.
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Akzo Nobel and Kemira of this joint venture are clearly not
the same. Akzo Nobel gains extra profitability and envir-
onmental benefits from the recovery of the by-product
(which was previously dumped at sea!). Kemira gains
access to a production source without meeting all the set
up costs. Again, an important indivisibility (between Akzo
Nobel’s main product and the joint venture’s by-product) is
a key factor in the choice of an IJV.
(3) The third case came about because of a complex
privatisation in Portugal where the joint venture LAP is
located. The Dutch partner Hoogovens supplies a basic
input to the (newly privatised) joint venture LAP, which it
entered because it wished to secure supply of its output to
the new company. The French Partner Usinor operates at the
same stage of production as the later stages of activity
carried out by LAP, and it wished to ensure prices and
quality at the output stage. The French and Dutch compan-
ies share ownership 50:50 (see Fig. 5 and Table 2).
(4) The fourth case is analogous in physical structure to
Case 1. The joint venture DSM-BASF produces an inter-
mediate product, which is supplied to the partner companies
for further processing (Fig. 6). The ownership is shared 60%
by the Dutch company DSM and 40% by the German
company BASF.
All IJVs present examples of barriers to full merger. In
the first case, none of A, B or G wish to wholly own the
joint venture production as they would have to ensure the
sale of the excess production or run the plant at less than the
optimal scale. In the second case, the joint venture Kemax is
merely using a by-product of Akzo Nobel’s main business,
and it would be infeasible for Kemira to buy the whole of
Akzo Nobel’s production just to obtain access to the by-
product. As Table 2 illustrates, only Case 3 is a completely
symmetrical joint venture (Makino, 1995). It is a classic
symmetrical case in that ownership is shared 50:50 and the
physical structure is identical for the two partners (Fig. 6).
This presents a useful benchmark for the three nonsym-
Fig. 5. The physical structure of the joint venture LAP.
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metrical cases. The four cases thus have important commo-
nalties. They are all IJVs with a Dutch partner. They are all
structured so as to manage the flows of intermediate
products linking the IJV with the parents (although in
different configurations). They are all trans-EU ventures.
From these basic commonalties, we are able to proceed with
confidence to apply a focus on the long-term study of the
development of trust.
The unit of analysis encompassed the board members and
people from the management team of the IJV (MIJV).
Tracking the joint venture in real time was not possible,
so we collected retrospective data by interviewing most of
the current board members and the MIJV, as well as former
board members who were representing their company dur-
ing the creation of the joint venture. A complementary
advantage of interviewing delegates from the several pa-
rents was that the reliability of the stories was checked. The
total amount of interviews was 16, which lasted, on
average, one hour and a half. During the interviews, we
used a semistructured questionnaire. Following Ring and
van de Ven (1994, p. 112), we let the respondents focus on
critical events during the lifetime of the joint venture. In
addition to these interviews, we obtained written documents
on the history of the companies. Second, we were allowed
to read the minutes of the board meetings. Third, we used
public information such as annual reports, public relations
material, press releases and information from the World
Wide Web.
The interviews were tape-recorded and fully transcribed.
The transcribed reports were sent back for factual data
verification. The data were analysed in three steps (Miles
and Huberman, 1994; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Firstly, the
transcribed interviews were broken into meaningful seg-
ments. Each segment brought out a major idea that was
coded and summarised in a one- or two-line sentence. The
interpretation of the quote was verified by sending the
format back to the respondents. After the meaningful seg-
ments were coded, we grouped them into the dimensions of
trust that were specified in the section above. The result of
this second step was a convenient arrangement of the
interview’s segments. Based on this coding, we analysed
the cases.
6. Test of the propositions
This section tests the propositions of the model using the
four case studies as examples. The discussion of each stage
examines the three dimensions of trust contained in our
definition. Our more general propositions (Propositions 1
and 2) are examined in the concluding section.
6.1. Proposition 3: previous history
This stage proved to be a valuable period of time to learn
about the prospective partner. We found three factors that
established a basic level of trust, namely prior exchange
between the companies on an organisational level (two
cases); direct personal contact between the initiators (two
cases); and the overall reputation of the company (four
cases). Through prior exchange Akzo Nobel and Kemira
had learnt about each other’s competencies. It even hap-
pened that Kemira bid for a part of Akzo Nobel before Akzo
Nobel acquired that part. Usinor bought raw materials from
Hoogovens ‘for years’ before they begun the IJV.
Direct personal contact between the initiators of Kemax
and DSM-BASF, gave an insight into their behaviour and
character. Because they operated in the same industry, they
had met each other before at trade fairs. During these
meetings, it appeared that the people who had to set up
the IJV could get along with each other and that they could
be taken at their word.
The reputation of the company played a role in all cases.
For example, Kemira’s market position was a sign for
Akzo Nobel that Kemira was a valuable partner. Gamma
knew Alpha and Beta as ‘leading companies in the pet-
rochemical industry.’ Alpha and Beta also believed that
Gamma would become a strong partner. An example is
Alpha’s and Beta’s reaction to Gamma’s plans for building
a plant near their plant: In order to prevent competition,
they contacted Gamma for possible cooperation instead of
competition. DSM regarded BASF as its ‘best competitor.’
‘‘They had particular resources that we liked to have. In
this way, we gained an insight into their competencies’’
(DSM). Fig. 7 presents the three factors that set an initial
level of trust between the partners: direct personal contact,
overall reputation and prior exchange. This is a more
nuance approach than the usual designation of reputation
effects.
6.2. Proposition 4: negotiations
Most of the interviewees stressed the importance of
mutual economic advantage. The conviction that the other
party would benefit from a joint venture strengthened the
belief that they would behave in a trustworthy fashion,
because such behaviour would be in their self-interest. In
addition to this key foundation of trust, we found a number
of other ways by which trust developed. The managers of
Kemax already started with a basic level of promissory-
based trust. Therefore, the psychological process of con-
structing a perception about the other’s trustworthiness took
Fig. 7. Factors affecting the development of trust from the firms’ previous
history.
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less time. Promissory-based trust was magnified through the
actual behaviour of the other:
When somebody says ‘I will sell 100.000-ton,’ you can
only check that after three years. So maybe it starts in a
very common way, that somebody says he will be
somewhere at eight and he is there at eight. In this way
somebody builds a reputation of ‘a man a man, a word a
word’ (Kemira).
The parties of ABG started without any prior experience
with each other before this joint venture. Only general
knowledge about the company as a whole was available.
Hence, promissory-based trust and goodwill-based trust
between the people had to be built up. This was done in a
variety of ways. The following quote illustrates how
Gamma tried to asses whether the others could be taken at
their word and whether they were sincere:
You have to make up your mind whether the fellows on
the other side of the table are just like yourself. I said to
myself, I am open, what I am saying I can stand for, I
am always truthful, not trying to put in some snares. We
are like that, so why shouldn’t the people on the other
side of the table be of the same kind? And that you
discover fairly quickly (Gamma).
Hence, the respondent used his own trustworthy beha-
viour as a reference point and trusted his partners until the
opposite was proven. Stated differently, he started with trust
instead of distrust. Such an attitude also emanated from the
belief that only by acting in good faith could good business
deals be made. The Alpha delegate also started with trust.
His attitude resulted from considering himself as being
naive, from lessons from other joint ventures and from the
idea that the joint venture was a business opportunity and
not a necessity. Hence, when people were not to be trusted
(and he would use his own judgement and intuition in order
to find this out), he would quit negotiations. In order to
come to an opinion, social meetings (like dinners before the
official meeting) played an important role. These meetings
facilitated a setting in which the delegates could make up
and adjust their perception about each other, thereby dis-
covering that they could get along with each other that trust
could be built. Competence-based trust already occurred in
the former stage, but could not be proven during this phase.
Keeping promises in situations of minor importance gradu-
ally leads to a reputation for trustworthiness. Competence in
these minor matters leads to competence-based trust even
where (as in the DSM-BASF case) openness was not
assumed by either party at the outset. The solution here
was effected by frequent face-to-face meetings, to which
purely social meetings were added. This led to the building
of common interest by the individuals involved and know-
ledge of more subtle details of each other, such as body
language. Examples include:
You get to know people better, including their body
language. I am better able to understand the way the
other person thinks and feels. The people know each
other by now, and when mister X says something, you
know that it is the truth (Gamma). And, what was very
essential was that we liked each other a lot. We
appreciated and respected each other, and when such a
basis is lacking, you can simply forget about the whole
thing (DSM).
The whole process towards the joint venture has a
strong influence on the development of personal
relationships. Our process towards the establishment
of the joint venture took a long time, so we grew close.
And in such a process an important factor is that people
get on with each other (LAP).
This personal friendship is both created and built on to
progress the IJV through mutual trust. One case shows that
getting along with each other on a personal basis is not a
necessary condition for the development of trust. Two
initiators could not really get along with each other, but
because of high levels of professional skills, competence-
based trust and promissory-based trust compensated for this
deficiency in building goodwill-based trust. Fig. 8 summa-
rises the factors that play an important role in the devel-
opment of trust during the negotiation stage. Keeping
promises, personal relationships and forbearance are import-
ant here.
6.3. Proposition 5: commitments
In the commitment stage, the wills of the parties meet
(Ring and van de Ven, 1994). The formal legal contract gave
the juridical security that both parties were committed to the
joint venture. In addition to this formal contract, a number
of psychological contracts also contributed to the devel-
opment of trust. These were the additional investments to
make the joint venture work and set the mode of coopera-
tion. In all cases, it was necessary to make extra investments
before the joint venture could start production. These invest-
ments were a signal for the partners that all parties were
long-term oriented and that they were committed to the jointFig. 8. Factors affecting the development of trust during negotiation stage.
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venture. Hence, financial investments reinforced goodwill-
based trust. This accords with Ganesan (1994) who calls
these investments ‘credible commitments’ (following Wil-
liamson, 1983). In addition to these investments, starting a
joint venture instead of a nonequity agreement appeared to
be a signal that the partner was to be trusted:
We have started a joint venture because we wanted to
create commitment towards both processes (production
and marketing) . . . Kemax has several production
locations. Therefore, it would be relatively easy for
them to drain this plant in case of a bad supply
agreement and to deliver from their own production
locations. And you never know how such things
develop in the future (Akzo Nobel).
Hence, the creation of a joint venture aligned the interest
of the parties, and, therefore, the parties trusted each other to
do their best for the joint venture while they had a self-
interest to do so.
However, a legal contract is seen as a last resort—
something to fall back on. Partners work things out in other
ways and will not often use the contract to enforce deci-
sions. Using the contract in order to make the other party
keep to the agreement is perceived to be damaging to the
long-run relationship. Examples include:
Putting things on paper is like a protection, normally
legal. However, when things function you could discuss
them over a cup of coffee as well as at a formal
meeting. I feel it is more because of a lack of
confidence, that you would like to have things on
paper, because then you have your back covered. I
don’t have that need and I think that there is nothing
wrong with a failure sometimes (Kemax).
We never have to use our documents after we have
signed them. But that is not unique for ABG, we have
this in all our joint ventures. We are of the opinion that
when a problem arises, we have to solve it in a friendly
way, and to discuss it irrespective of what has been
written in the legal documents (Alpha).
Fig. 9 presents the factors that develop trust during the
commitment stage. The formal legal contract and supporting
investments reinforce ongoing cooperative behaviour.
6.4. Proposition 6: execution
During the execution stage, the expectations raised dur-
ing the previous three stages are confirmed or confounded.
Considering ABG, we conclude that trust between the
parties only strengthened. Kemax showed a decrease in
competence-based trust in time. However, after its perform-
ance improved, trust was restored. Trust between the people
of ABG became stronger mainly due to a growing personal
bond between most of the delegates, which resulted in
friendship between some of the board members. This
personal bond started during negotiations, when the partic-
ipants found out that they could get along with each other
very well. The bond stimulated cooperative behaviour (i.e.,
showing empathy and giving support) when ABG began to
have financial problems. It happened that additional fin-
ancing was needed in order to assure survival of the joint
venture. One party was not able to make this extra invest-
ment, without bringing itself into severe financial problems.
It turned out that both European partners were ready to solve
ABG’s problems on their own by financing Gamma’s part as
a loan to ABG. The following quote illustrates the motiva-
tion to do so:
I felt such a sympathy for Gamma’s delegate and his
companion, that when we would have followed the
rules of the game, they would have gone down the
drain. So I put a lot of effort into finding all kinds of
ways to help him, without betraying Alpha and Beta. I
knew the joint venture was his baby so I did not want to
let him down because I liked him too much for that . . .
So, it was not self-interest but pity for the other partner
(Alpha).
Hence, the social relationship between the people stimu-
lated support, although it was not required economically.
The bond was maintained through social events (such as
dinners before the board meeting, weekends with spouses).
Two board members kept visiting each other even after
their retirement. The result of this growing bond was that
although each delegate kept advocating their own firm’s
interests, the members actively looked for consensus when
Fig. 9. Factors affecting the development of trust during the commitment
stage.
Fig. 10. Factors affecting the development of trust during the execution
stage.
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the interests were opposing. Such behaviour, in turn, rein-
forced trust.
Goodwill-based trust also results in acceptance of failure
to perform according to expectations for a given period of
time. The case of Kemax is an example of this. From the start,
the intermediate product plant did not perform optimally.
This was due to an ongoing failure of Akzo Nobel to solve a
technical problem. Kemira, however, believed that Akzo
Nobel made an effort to solve the problem because it was
also in the interest of Akzo Nobel to solve it as quickly as
possible. After all, low performance of the plant directly
affected Akzo Nobel’s performance as a whole (i.e., Akzo
Nobel had a clear self-interest to solve the problem). Hence,
goodwill-based trust had the effect that Kemira kept compet-
ence-based trust in Akzo Nobel for quite a period of time.
Moreover, Kemira did not monitor Akzo Nobel’s endeavours
as they trusted the information that Akzo Nobel presented.
This is a sign of Kemira’s promissory-based trust in Akzo
Nobel, which developed during the former stages. Yet, after 4
years, Kemira’s tolerance for Akzo Nobel’s failure decreased;
they started to think that they would send their own people in
order to investigate the problems. In addition, the partners
arranged an extra board meeting to discuss the problem.
However, before this happened, Akzo Nobel succeeded in
resolving the problem thereby taking away Kemira’s worries
and removing potential competence-based distrust.
An important mechanism in the execution stage is
monitoring. However, in all four cases, monitoring was
indirect rather than direct. Through indirect monitoring,
the partners keep themselves posted on changes in their
partner’s behaviour, strategy or environment. Changes may
be an indication of changing self-interest in the joint
venture. Indirect signals are used to maintain mutual trust
in the joint venture. Fig. 10 summarises the factors dis-
cussed in this section. In this stage, ongoing cooperative
behaviour reinforces trust, while technical incompetence can
damage trust.
7. Discussion
The paper started with the observation that, although
many scholars have stated that trust has a positive effect on
IJV performance, only a few studies have investigated the
development of trust over time. Specifically, it was found
that competence-based trust develops before the parties
come together. Moreover, this proved to be an important
factor in selecting a partner. The data reveal that this
dimension of trust is somewhat impersonal; it is mainly
based on company specific characteristics. The facts that
lead to such a perception are predominantly of a public
nature. Hence, before the parties really meet to start a joint
venture, competence-based trust develops mainly through
the performance of a company. Promissory-based trust and
goodwill-based trust are, however, more person oriented and
based on individual knowledge. These two types of trust
mainly develop through direct personal interaction. Congru-
ent industries increase the likelihood of prior interaction,
while delegates of similar industries may come together at
trade fairs. Such prior interaction may also contribute to the
creation of ties between firms. As one respondent noted: ‘‘a
lot of business is emerging from the fact that people know
each other.’’ Having a trustworthy reputation is therefore
extremely important.
The cases, however, show a difference in trust before
negotiations. Whereas Kemax started with a positive initial
level of all three dimensions of trust between the parties,
ABG began with only a basic level of competence-based
trust. The latter case showed, however, that promissory-
based trust and goodwill-based trust can also be built during
negotiations. On the other hand, as one respondent noted, it
saves negotiation time when parties do not have to gather
information on each other, when this has already been done
before negotiations.
The commitment stage confirms the goodwill of the other
party. The data suggest that trust is based mainly on the
perceived economic self-interest of the other: Contracts
establish fear of coercion; choosing a joint venture aligns
the material advantage of the partner. In other words, during
this stage, perceived economic self-interest of the other party
seems to be a main source of trust. We found that trust based
on emotions may develop during the execution stage. In
order to develop this trust, friendship between the delegates
plays an important role. Bonds of friendship have the effect
that people listen to each other more carefully, support each
other when difficulties arise, are more open and direct in their
communication and look for consensus when the interests are
opposing. Such behaviour successively strengthens trust.
The different cases show that time is important in order to
let such bonds grow.While all cases start with people that can
get along with each other, ABG shows that such a bond may
transform itself into friendship. When personal bonds dom-
inate the main source of trust shifts from perceived self-
interest towards emotional commitment.
The investigation has thus highlighted 14 factors that the
partners use to build and sustain trust in IJVs and one factor
that leads to distrust. These are incorporated in Figs. 7–10.
Most of the factors establish goodwill-based trust in the
partner, that is, the factors create an expectation that the
other party will take care of the interests of ego (Hosmer,
1995) and may be willing to do more than is formally
expected (Sako 1992). We found that this goodwill-based
trust is mainly based on the other’s perceived economic self-
interest. Most of the factors are particularly useful for
assessing and confirming the other’s economic self-interest.
For example, partners put themselves into the other’s shoes
to understand the other’s economic self-interest. The con-
tract strengthens the belief that the other has indeed a self-
interest (otherwise, they would not sign the contract). Trust
is only based on emotions when bonds of friendship
develop. ABG shows evidence for this proposition. Such a
friendship is more than ‘getting on with each other.’ It
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includes feelings of affection and warmth, and the involved
persons see each other also outside the joint venture
relationship. In this case, the development of trust thus runs
from the top line of Table 1 towards the bottom line—from
egotistic to nonegotistic behaviour.
8. Conclusion
The case studies illustrate several key findings. First, we
believe that trust can be seen both as an output and an input
at various stages of the process. Propositions 1 and 2 are
vindicated. It is possible to see the development of trust as a
sequential process and a linear form of this process, broken
into stages serves the analysis well. Second, we can observe
forbearance (as defined above) both in its strong form
(avoiding damage to the other party) and in its weak form
(avoiding omitting actions which benefit the partner). A
good example of the former is the forbearance shown by
Kemira when Akzo Nobel was failing to correct a defect in
the plant. The latter form is illustrated when Alpha helped to
solve Gamma’s financial problems. Third, reputation effects
are important, as an appreciating asset brought to the table in
the first stage and as an operating asset as promises are
delivered or overfulfilled. Fourth, from a transaction cost
point of view, the cases illustrate some very important
advantages of joint ventures (Buckley and Casson, 1988).
The joint venture ABG (1) allows hedging against changes in
the price movement of the intermediate product; (2) sees to it
that long-term supply is assured; (3) makes sure that opera-
tional integration between upstream and downstream activ-
ities is achieved; and (4) implements quality assurance in
supplies. The joint venture Kemax (1) allows efficient uti-
lisation of a by-product of a separate process and (2) prevents
competition from a (second) source of production. Through
the LAP joint venture, Hoogovens secured its supply to the
joint venture and Usinor prevented the growth of competition
in the Iberian market. The risks of financing the takeover
were shared. The joint operations of DSM-BASF provided
economies of scale, but the attitude of key clients prevented a
full merger—there was a strong chance that the acquiring
party would loose customers when the business was sold. The
cases illustrate a combination of internalisation economies,
indivisibilities and barriers to merger. In addition, the IJVs
provide a context where the partners demonstrate mutual
forbearance and therefore build up trust. A key thread, which
runs through the exposition, is that trust reinforces self-
interest and is often seen to be there when self-interest is
clearly congruent with trusting behaviour.
In terms of our process model as presented in Fig. 2, we
can see from the summary of results (Fig. 11) that it
performs well. At every stage, we can identify outputs of
trust, which become inputs into the next stage (see also the
recursive model of Madhok, 1995b). Not all the assump-
tions in the conceptual model are justified, and we find one
instance of an output of distrust. The research findings
reveal a rich picture and suggest that the model is a useful
one for the further examination of trust building processes in
IJVs. Indeed, the results are richer in many areas than the
original conceptual model initially suggested. For instance,
the personal elements of relationships and feelings (e.g.,
‘‘putting oneself into the other’s shoes’’) are shown to be
important. Moreover, it appears that promissory-based trust
is important early in the process and competence-based trust
later in the sequence of stages. Trust based on individual self
interest thus grows, through forbearance to a commitment to
cooperate, which is self-reinforcing (Buckley and Casson,
1988). Goodwill is important throughout. These preliminary
results provide an excellent basis for more research—and, in
particular, for testing our model on a wider sample of firms.
Our research has limitations. It is based on only four case
studies. These case studies cannot be considered represent-
ative of all IJVs because of their industrial and cultural
biases. Generalisation is only possible by applying our
model to further examples. Because our model is longit-
udinal, it is necessary to test it against the behaviour of firms
over time—a difficult, costly and time-consuming enter-
prise. It is not easy to transform our model to make it
suitable for point-of-time cross-sectional postal question-
naire type approaches. However, we believe that longit-
udinal analysis is the correct way to proceed in IJV research.
The next step is to confront our model with a richer, more
widely dispersed set of cases, with more cultural and
structural variety in the IJVs analysed in order to investigate
its degree of robustness. It may also be possible in future
research to move forward from our linear model to a more
realistic, recursive flow schema.
Fig. 11. The research model: findings of the four illustrative cases.
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